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The global financial system is going through turmoil triggered 
by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. Severe 
adjustments befell all sorts of financial markets, and financial 
institutions are very vulnerable to potential shocks from deteriora- 
ting economic conditions. This paper briefly recaps the ongoing 
global financial crisis and its impact it has had on Korean financial 
markets and economy. It also comments on some issues of crisis 
management strategies in the short-run, including bailouts and 
coutercyclical macroeconomic policies. Lastly, from a long-term 
perspective, it proposes an appropriate policy direction for prevent- 
ing and managing future crises.
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I. Introduction
A financial crisis is a subject of much academic research and media 
attention, dominating headlines and commentaries. For example, keying 
in ‘financial crisis’ into ECONLIT database, you will get more than four 
thousand results. 
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We are now facing a global financial turmoil that first emerged as a 
liquidity crisis in August 2007 and peaked in the collapse of major 
global investment banks in September 2008. The global financial 
system is going through severe adjustments and very vulnerable to 
potential shocks from a sharp deterioration of economic conditions 
triggered by the crisis. It is a historically unprecedented event in many 
ways and when the storm will end is yet unknown. So it may be too 
early to draw definitive lessons from current global crisis in financial 
markets. 
But there are also many common features that all financial crises 
share, along with their more idiosyncratic elements such as their 
cause, magnitude, impacts, and duration. As they are very complex, we 
must appropriately recognize relevant factors such as, the underlying 
cause, the pervasiveness of the problems, or whether the problem 
poses systemic risks. Doing this allows us to accurately assess the 
nature of the crisis, formulate corrective measures to handle it, and lay 
the foundations for the more robust future financial system.
The rest of this paper is divided into three parts. First, we will briefly 
recap on the ongoing global financial crisis and its impacts on Korea. 
Second, we will comment on issues of some crisis management strategies. 
Lastly we have proposed an appropriate policy direction for preventing 
and managing future crises.
II. Understanding the Current Crisis
The root causes of the current global crisis are well summarized in 
the recent Declaration of the G20 Summit on Financial Markets and 
the World Economy.1 Although the crisis started off as an isolated 
event in the U.S. subprime mortgage market which represents only 
about 14 percent of U.S. mortgage market, it quickly escalated and 
1 “During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and 
prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields 
without an adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due 
diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards, unsound risk manage- 
ment practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial products, and con- 
sequent excessive leverage combined to create vulnerabilities in the system. 
Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not 
adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, 
keep pace with financial innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifica- 
tions of domestic regulatory actions.” 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND KOREA 79
engulfed all kinds of financial markets and institutions. This process is 
described under various names including ‘liquidity spiral’ (IMF 2008), 
‘risk amplifier’ (Bank of England 2008), and ‘financial accelerator’ 
(Bernanke 2007), which made the crisis ‘wider, deeper and more 
damaging than originally thought.’2 And it has spread fast to all over 
the world through, for example, ‘an international financial multiplier’ 
(Krugman 2008b).
Here we can identify a number of factors that have caused the 
current global financial crisis. First very low short-term and long-term 
real interest rates, intensified competition among financial institutions, 
and greed to chase higher returns encouraged a pervasive search for 
yield. Traditional prudent management practices were neglected as 
financial institutions focused on enhancing short-term performance. 
Misguided assumptions about the future path of asset prices strengthened 
investors’ risk appetite. And favorable macroeconomic environment with 
cheap money and sustained economic growth allowed easy refinancing.
Second, financial innovations such as securitization and a shift of 
business model from the ‘originate to hold’ towards an ‘originate to 
distribute’ made banks and other financial institutions blind to the 
underlying risks behind higher return, and weakened their incentives 
to conduct due diligence on borrowers. In the ‘originate to hold’ model, 
banks hold the credit originations on their balance sheet until 
maturity. But in ‘originate to distribute,’ banks remove the loans from 
their balance sheet, and securitize and sell them to investors in the 
market. Along the way, rating agencies failed to recognize and assess 
correctly the risk exposures hidden in the complexity of the transactions 
and instruments. 
Also the development of derivative products and unwarranted optimism 
about the continuous availability of borrowed liquidity allowed financial 
institutions excessive leverage, widespread maturity mismatches, and 
high risk concentrations, widening the gap between finance and real 
economy. The whole financial system created more credit than it can 
support. This excessive leverage and credit growth contributed to the 
vulnerability of the financial system.
Meanwhile financial sector supervision and regulations lagged behind 
rapid innovations in the financial market. Regulators were overly confi-
2 Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Bernanke testified in July 2007 that credit 
losses associated with subprime mortgages would probably total $50 to $100 
billion.
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III. Impacts on Korea
A. Financial Markets
The direct impacts, driven by losses from investments in troubled 
mortgage-related securities and failed institutions, are not large enough 
to seriously damage the Korean financial industry and economy although 
they are not trivial as shown in Table 1. The size of investment of Korean 
financial institutions in subprime mortgage related products with 
Lehman and Merrill Lynch is estimated to 720 million dollars. Losses 
from foreign investment are very unlikely to let major banks and 
non-bank financial institutions in Korea to go bankrupt or subject to 
solvency risk. The soundness of the banking sector remains strong as 
the exposure of Korean financial institutions is relatively small, 450 
billion Korean won (KRW). However, the indirect impacts may turn to 
be detrimental unless they are properly managed. The critical challenge 
facing the Korean policymakers is to take immediate steps to 
successfully reduce the indirect impacts arising from the global 
economic recession and credit squeeze.
As the dollar liquidity dries up due to global financial turmoil, it is 
very difficult to borrow dollars. Also credit default swap (CDS) premiums 
for Asian emerging countries have increased significantly since the 
Lehman Brothers filed bankruptcy protection. Figure 2 and Figure 3 
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TABLE 1
CDO POSSESSION OF KOREAN BANKS RELATED TO SUB-PRIME
Banks
Subprime CDO
(unit: 10K$)
Loss
Total CDO 
possession
Woori 49,200 Write off 193B￦
Plan to write off +240B￦
+0.6B$ CDO
Nong-hyup 11,000 Write Off 8.9B￦ -
KEB 373 Sell 3.17M$ CDO
Plan to write off 0.56M$
Sell 17M$
Out of 42M$
Shinhan 530 Plan to write off 1.5M$ -
KDB 300 Repay 0.5M$
Plan to write off 0.45M$
-
Source: CEIC.
FIGURE 2
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show the trend that the interbank offered rate and CDS premium have 
been increasing in East Asia countries.
As more and more investors refuse to invest in risky assets with 
higher counterparty risk, dollar liquidity shortage exacerbated in Korea 
until the Bank of Korea reached currency swap agreement with Federal 
Reserve Bank on October 30. Figure 4 shows that the dollar market 
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Source: Bloomberg.
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Source: FnGuide.
FIGURE 5
CORPORATE BOND AND TREASURY BOND YIELD
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TABLE 2
FOREIGNER’S NET PURCHASE OF STOCK
(Unit: US$ 100 Mil., %)
Taiwan India Thailand Indonesia Philippines Korea
Market 
Capitalization
(The end of Nov.)
3,689.6 5,538.3 861.1 783.6 481.0 4,032.4
Foreigners' 
Holding Ratio
   30.3
(The end 
of Nov.)
    9.5
(The end 
of Nov.)
 31.0
(The end 
of Aug.)
  21.2
(The end 
of 2005)
 10.9
(The end 
of 2005)
   27.9
(The end 
of Nov.)
2007 
Net Purchase   25.9 172.4  15.7   35.8  12.5  -294.2
2008 
Net Purchase
(Jan.~Nov.)
-168.6 -135.9 -46.0   17.3 -131.1  -373.5
Source: Bloomberg.
has been very tight since Lehman Brothers collapsed in September.  
The interest rates on currency rate swap (CRS) plunged to zero 
percent, implying that domestic dollar liquidity conditions were very 
poor. 
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Due to the dollar liquidity pressure, most of major currencies in 
Asian countries have been weak against dollars. Compared with other 
East Asian currencies, KRW has depreciated the most. As of the end of 
November, 2008, KRW depreciated 56.9% from the end of 2007, posting 
a far larger drop than the other currencies such as Indonesia (30.4%) 
and India (27.1%).
Besides negative current account balance and expectation of further 
depreciation of KRW, foreign investors’ selling spree of Korean stocks 
also contributed to the weakening of Korean currency and its high 
volatility. As of the end of November, foreign investors sold 37.4 billion 
dollars of Korean stocks in 2008 after selling 29.4 billion dollars in 
2007. The shareholding ratio of foreign investors in Korean stock 
market has been reduced to 27.9% as of the end of November 2008 
from 35.2% in 2006.
As the credit risk gets substantial, the loan supply has been reduced 
sharply and in the bond market the credit spreads between corporate 
bonds and government bonds have widened, reflecting strong risk 
aversion of investors and reference for safer assets.
B. Real Economy
The Korean economy can be affected by the global financial crisis via 
various complex channels. The credit crunch in funds market may 
increase the default risk of household and real estate finance. The 
weak Korean currency leads to higher prices of imported goods and 
aggravates profitability of Korean companies. The plunge in stock 
market can hurt consumption expenditure via negative wealth effect 
and the resulting low demand will worsen business sentiment. Also 
decrease in exports due to global recession can slow down the economic 
growth. As of November, 2008, the IMF forecasted minus economic 
growth rates for the U.S., Euro areas, and Japan, respectively, -0.7%, 
-0.5%, and -0.2%. In addition, it expected that China would have 8.5% 
growth rate in 2009, which is a big drop from 11.9% in 2007 and   
9.7% in 2008. Since the economic growth of Korea is highly dependent 
upon exports, the global recession may trap the Korean economy into a 
vicious circle where reduced exports setback the domestic economy and 
make households and SMEs more vulnerable to default risk, which in 
turn deteriorates the asset qualities of financial institutions. The extent 
to which the current crisis affects the Korean real economy depends on 
how serious the global recession and how long they will last.
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IV. Issues in Crisis Management Strategies
A. Short-Run Government Intervention
When financial crises are systemic, government intervention is 
unavoidable. An eventual collapse of the financial system is costlier than 
the corresponding fiscal and political costs of government intervention.
In this global financial turmoil, the immediate challenges will be how 
to stabilize the financial markets, restore public confidence, and 
coordinate macroeconomic policies to avoid spillovers of financial crisis 
into real economy. All of these must be accomplished while minimizing 
the taxpayers’ burden and moral hazards.
The Declaration of G20 Summit explains that countries affected by 
the crisis have taken strong and significant actions to provide liquidity 
by central banks, strengthen the balance sheets of financial institutions 
by capital injection, protect savings and deposits, address regulatory 
deficiencies, unfreeze credit markets, stimulate the economies, and 
reinforce international cooperation. More recently some regulatory 
forbearances have begun in the areas of accounting and prudential 
regulations to provide liquidity and support toward weak institutions.
The global economic and financial environments are changing 
rapidly, along with a significant paradigm shift of economic policies and 
financial regulations as well.
As for Korea, it is not in the best condition, but domestic problems 
are within our control and could be contained if the government does 
the right things at the right time. Korea's primary concern in the 
short-run is to ease domestic liquidity squeeze and reduce the credit 
crunch, gearing the economy towards a ‘soft-landing,' while avoiding 
excessive moral hazards. Credit crunches are likely to cause chain 
reactions of bankruptcies, rapid economic slowdown and further 
financial hardship due to high indebtedness of households and SME's. 
Well-designed intervention, with appropriate timing, scope, and 
speed, should be implemented in the early stages of crises to contain 
and resolve it. How the current crisis is resolved could sow the seeds of 
future crises. 
Lessons from previous crises in history suggest that promptness, 
correct incentive schemes, and comprehensive and credible measures 
are the general principles that should be observed to contain the 
spread of fear, restore calm and confidence, and minimize the costs of 
intervention in the longer run.  
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As for timing, it is important for authorities to act promptly, after the 
causes and size of the problem are identified through a complete and 
systematic evaluation. As for scope, usual responses go in three stages. 
In early stage, confidence in the system can be restored by a com- 
bination of government support and liquidity provision to prevent runs 
on banks. Next, troubled assets and the recapitalization of the banks 
need to be addressed. In the long run, measures to improve institutional 
framework should follow, as well as, including the accounting, disclosure, 
legal and regulatory environment. The OECD (2008) summarized some 
lessons drawn from previous financial crises or their resolution:
• A proper identification of the nature of a crisis is necessary if the 
correct instructions are to be applied.
• Liquidations tend to be costly and are perhaps best used as a last 
resort or only under specific circumstances.
• Forbearance may be helpful in avoiding severe dislocations, but it 
is a risky proposition that can prove very costly if used improperly.
•Guarantees may be necessary, but they must be properly structured 
and be given a finite life to avoid high costs and moral hazard.
• It is important to develop a thorough understanding of the various 
dimensions of the too-big-to-fail phenomenon and its implications.
• There is a need to properly address interdependencies for institu- 
tions operating in or funding themselves across multiple jurisdic- 
tions.
• It is important that prudential requirements and other safety and 
soundness standards are incentive compatible and properly aligned 
with developments in risk management.
•Runs on market liquidity occur more often than runs on bank 
deposits.
• An important step in crisis resolutions is the treatment of non- 
performing assets.
•Weaknesses associated with asymmetric, insufficient, or incorrect 
information are endemic in modern financial markets and have yet 
to be successfully addressed.
•Considerable work remains on the consumer awareness front.
a) Bailouts
Here the critical question is, whether bailouts should be at penalty 
interest rates and only on good collateral, and whether widespread 
support including insolvent institutions is preferable or should bailouts 
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focus on helping solvent banks experiencing temporary liquidity shortages 
to minimize moral hazard problem? Also should we abandon supporting 
weak institutions and turn to help suffering consumers?
When a crisis is systemic and involves self-fulfilling runs, only 
sweeping guarantees and extensive support can stop the panic in the 
market. But when the balance sheets of financial institutions are 
fundamentally weak and the systemic insolvency is deep, such support 
may not be able to even halt the spread of crisis but delay healthy 
adjustments. World Bank (2008) points out that extensive short-term 
bailout policy seldom actually speeds the recovery of a nation’s real 
economy from a financial crisis or lessens the decline in aggregate 
output. Instead, providing liquidity support for insolvent institutions 
often prolongs a crisis and increases the ultimate fiscal cost of resolving 
crises. Also providing extensive liquidity support and guarantees to 
insolvent institutions subsidizes risk-taking, undermines market discip- 
line and increases the likelihood of future crises. But on the other 
hand, there is often not enough information for deciding which financial 
institutions are sound and in general it is not easy to invoke prompt 
corrective action for systemic events.
b) Monetary Easing versus Fiscal Expansion
As financial woes spill over to real economy, it is also in desperate 
need of help. There are widespread fears that there will be a Japanese- 
style ‘lost decade.’ What would be the appropriate macroeconomic coun- 
tercyclical measures to prevent the downturn?
Monetary policy seems to face dilemmas. As we have experienced, 
during the Asian crisis, sharp monetary contractions are not effective 
measures to defend domestic financial systems and exchange rates 
from speculative attacks and sinking currencies. Rising interest rates 
put heavy burden on debt holders and deepens the real economic 
downturn, as is what happened in the Great Depression. On the other 
hand, expansionary monetary policy in times of crisis will not work 
properly and is correspondingly ineffective as the channels through 
which it affects the real economy are still clogged. Banks facing high 
credit risk will simply hoard the money even if the government pumps 
liquidity into the system. 
Then should we turn to fiscal policy to smooth out the output and 
employment cost of a crisis? Krugman (2008a) and Spilimbergo et al. 
(2008) suggest what we need right now is to not worry about a fiscal 
deficit but ‘getting fiscal’ by more government spending, providing 
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extended benefits to the distressed families, offering emergency aid to 
local governments and engaging in some serious infrastructure spending. 
Münchau (2008) even argued that fiscal policy, more than monetary 
policy, will determine how and when this crisis will be resolved. 
B. Long-term Tasks and Issues
The current situation is often called a crisis of credibility for Anglo- 
Saxon financial capitalism and belief in free markets. It also opened up 
big questions about the workability of securitized lending, the role of 
central banks, regulators and rating agencies, and global macroeconomic 
imbalances (Wolf 2008). So we have also longer term tasks ahead 
including rethinking financial regulation, central banking and the 
management of global imbalances.
a) Globalization and Vulnerability to External Shocks
The process of globalization and financial development has been 
prone to crises. In the long run, financial development is expected to 
support economic growth and to reduce poverty. But, along the way, 
even relatively mature financial systems are vulnerable to banking 
crises, booms and busts and financial volatility (World Bank 2008). 
Globalization has probably facilitated contagion of the 2008 financial 
crisis. This appears to be partly intrinsic and partly due to policy 
mistakes. It arises as banks expand and capital markets generate 
various financial products, including derivatives. This entails new and 
unfamiliar risks for financial intermediaries and regulators. Furthermore, 
crises are easily transmitted across borders as countries become more 
open to capital flows. While the long-run relationship between financial 
development and growth is positive, the short-run relationship between 
them is negative due to financial fragility.
Developing countries have taken measures to build up buffers and 
insulate themselves from the external shocks, by accumulating large 
reserves, switching to long-term and domestic currency borrowing, and 
reducing fiscal and current account deficits. However hard they try, it 
is difficult to avoid the tradeoff between the benefits of economic and 
financial integration and the risk of being susceptible to contagious 
effects. 
Some aspects of the financial integration process, however, can 
change the terms of the tradeoff. These include how much the country 
relies on portfolio investment versus foreign direct investment (FDI), the 
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extent of reliance on short-term debt and simply whether the country is 
part of the portfolio investment of international investors. Also, a sound 
legal framework and stable political environment that attracts foreign 
capital and the influence of a country’s history of default on capital 
flows are important factors.
b) Banks versus Capital Markets
The current bank-oriented financial system in Korea should be 
shifted to seek a balanced development between the banking sector 
and the capital market. In the U.S. and Europe, commercial banking is 
growing while investment banking is shrinking due to the global 
financial crisis. Top five global investment banks disappeared from the 
center stage of history. One filed for bankruptcy protection, two merged 
by commercial banks, and the remaining two turned into commercial 
banks. However, in Korea, the capital market should be fostered 
further more. The size of the capital market is only 50~60% to that of 
advanced countries, not to mention that most of the bonds outstanding 
are issued by the government and other public sectors while SMEs 
have hardly access to direct funding. More diverse and stable financial 
services should be provided through the capital market.
c) Capital Adequacy
In theory and practice, the Basel II bank capital regime is under 
attack in the sense that it should be reworked in favor of higher 
minimum capital ratios, making the regime countercyclical, adding a 
leverage ratio alongside the risk-weighted capital measure, and tempo- 
rarily dropping use of credit ratings and internal models to calculate 
risk weights.
The aim of capital adequacy regulation is to align the amount of 
capital that banks set aside to absorb unexpected losses, with the 
amount of risk that they are taking. The existing minimum risk- 
weighted capital ratio, 8 percent of risk-weighted assets, seems to be 
too low compared to losses and write-downs of the financial institutions 
during this crisis and even higher capital above minimum would be 
inadequate to deal with the bad credit decisions that have been made.
The credibility of one of Basel II’s main innovations has also been 
damaged by the crisis. Basel II tries to put much of the responsibility 
for assessing risks to credit-rating agencies and the banks themselves, 
allowing banks to use credit ratings as risk weights and internal 
models to determine their regulatory capital requirements. The per- 
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formance of credit rating agencies has been dismal and so too with the 
performance of banks’ internal models. There are also concerns that 
Basel II takes insufficient account of systemic risks (Economist 2008). 
The solution of these problems is not to discard risk-weighted capital 
measures entirely, but to back up the risk-weighted capital measure by 
something else. We may borrow from other disciplines to capture the 
network effects between financial institutions. Or we may simply add, 
as Swiss regulators do, leverage ratio requirement to biggest banks, not 
allowing for any risk-weighting of assets. There is also the idea of 
dynamic provisioning adopted by Spanish regulators. Others want to 
see a systemic capital charge based on overall asset growth, which 
would help banks to strengthen buffers in good times.
d) Dynamic Provisioning
Dynamic provisioning tries to deal with procyclical bank lending 
(Kraft 2004). Provisions increase as banks’ profits increase (‘income- 
smoothing’) and decrease as GDP falls and as loan growth increases 
(over-optimism), much like Keynes’ attitude towards fiscal policies. 
Provisioning is believed to be a cause of lending procyclicality. Current 
provisioning practice is backward-looking, based on recognition of 
events that have already occurred. Accounting standards support this 
partly because it decreases discretion and gives a good picture of the 
bank at a moment of time. But economists feel that this approach fails 
to recognize future losses that are sure to happen but we don’t know 
exactly when. 
When a crisis hits, it is harder to raise capital. Lower profits or even 
losses make it painful to create provisions. Increased provisions are 
usually seen by markets as a sign of problems and lead to further 
share price declines. So dynamic provisioning seems attractive as a way 
to decrease financial instability. But it is easiest to implement in stable 
markets with long data series and stable provisioning levels. For now, 
we should either be patient and wait for more data or look at other 
ways to achieve the same goals.
e) Liquidity Requirement
Over past 50 years or so, banks in many G7 countries have 
economized unduly in the shares of cash and liquid assets in their 
total assets. This longer-term trend was exacerbated in the run-up to 
this crisis. A crisis comes with liquidity shortages. So a liquidity 
guideline is needed to withstand prolonged interruption of unsecured 
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financing. The task is to set up clearer picture of what constitutes 
minimum regulatory liquidity, along with greater incentives for holding 
it and for sharing it with others. 
In regards to this, Goldstein (2008) offers three proposals: (i) regulators 
would define regulatory liquidity narrowly: would give a dominant role to 
cash and to treasuries that would retain their unquestioned liquidity in a 
crisis; would penalize very short-term financing relative to longer-term 
financing; regulators would set minimum quantitative benchmark for 
bank liquidity much in the same spirit as Basle I quantitative bank 
capital requirement was established in late 1980s; (ii) need to establish 
private-sector liquidity pools among systemically-important players; 
each member of pool deposits with pool an agreed quota of treasuries 
that it could draw instantaneously when needed and without challenge; 
each member would be able to overdraft by several times if needed to 
meet unusually large liquidity strains; all pool members would agree as 
a condition of membership to allow their deposits to be lent to other 
members; since pool members would include some banks with insured 
deposits, unlikely that all pool members would be short liquidity at 
same time; market and default risks would be borne exclusively by 
members of the pool; (iii) when liquidity needs went beyond the 
capabilities of the pool, members would turn to their national central 
bank to act as lender of last resort. Access to central bank liquidity 
facilities would carry a higher cost of borrowing than in the pool and 
there would be a strong presumption that official liquidity assistance 
could come only after private sources had been exhausted.
f) Compensation Scheme
Compensation schemes are an integral part of risk management. But 
drawing up sensible pay schemes is far more complex. Rajan (2008) 
argues that Wall Street managers understand that they can’t get paid 
much for taking on the general risk of the market (so called beta risk). 
On the other hand they can get paid handsomely for beating the 
market return regularly, that is, you will get well rewarded for ‘alpha’ 
risk, generating excess returns. The problem is that managers have an 
incentive to take on false alpha exposing them to hidden tail risk as he 
can get paid more for it.
The rub, as Rajan (2008) explains it, is that true alpha can be 
measured only in the long run with the benefit of hindsight. As such, if 
you pay top managers bonuses based on annual profits but you don’t 
claw back the losses when the tail risk materializes, then you create 
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large incentives for those managers to create false alpha. 
The antidote for false alpha is to have a deferred compensation plan 
where the manager can only get part of his bonus upfront and the rest 
only when superior performance is confirmed over a period of years. 
Also annual bonuses payment can be linked to more rigorous measure 
of risk-adjusted profits. But applying these measures to people below 
management level is no small task and poses practical difficulties as 
there are thousands of positions, some of them hedges. It is an art not 
a science (Economist 2008). 
Another way to handle the inappropriate pay scheme is to offer 
complying firms an incentive in the form of a lower regulatory capital 
charge for implementing sensible deferred compensation plans. The 
current Basel II bank capital regime addresses many factors that affect 
the risk-taking behavior of banks but omits this very important one, 
namely, how you get paid for taking risk. That should be changed.
One example of a very creative compensation scheme was the one 
imposed by Credit Suisse. The investment banking arm, who has 
accumulated the largest amount of write-downs and losses for the 
bank, has been given their own toxic assets as bonuses. This self- 
reward system with the products they are selling forces them to not 
only know more about their product, but also makes sure no moral 
mistakes are made. 
V. Closing Remarks
If there is one lesson that stands out, it is that effective responses to 
a crisis require sound data and that they must take into account 
market players’ incentives and behavior. The short-term responses to a 
crisis must take into account the longer term implications for 
development and vulnerability to future crises. There will be difficult 
choices that are brought up against the inevitable tradeoffs between 
rapid crisis responses and longer-term goals.
We shouldn't forget the fundamental principles that ‘high returns 
come with high risks’ and ‘fast growth comes with the risk of rapid 
collapse.’ We should always be careful not to be ‘over-confident’ about 
the role of risk management as it is always prone to loopholes no 
matter how advanced it is.
The financial industry, which is remotely dislocated from the real 
economy, is on  shaky ground. Financial industry is a service industry, 
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and the service industry that does not serve those that should be 
served is a house of cards or a sand castle (Lee 2008). But it appears 
that the financial industry tends to dislocate itself from the real 
economy as it grows at a rapid pace. It should be reminded that the 
financial sector becomes worthless if it fails to interact with the real 
economy.
Major regulatory reform will not be achieved for free. When tougher 
capital and liquidity requirements are put into effect for banks, along 
with reform of the over-the-counter derivative markets, one can expect 
lower leverage, slower asset growth and probably, a lower average profit 
rate in the financial service industry vis- a｀ -vis what had come to be 
expected in the run-up to this crisis. Of course, the other side of the 
coin is that these regulatory reforms will contribute to fewer severe 
financial crises that we wind-up paying for either in the form of lower 
interest rates on savings deposits or in the form of taxpayer financed 
bailouts of troubled financial institutions. For over a hundred year, 
financial market regulation has improved mostly when crisis has 
shown up its shortcomings. This current crisis will be just another 
opportunity of making current financial system more fairly and more 
efficiently.
(Received 24 November 2008; Revised 13 February 2009)
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